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Abstract
Wikipedia is a prime example of today’s value production in a collaborative
environment. Using this example, we model the emergence, persistence and
resolution of severe conflicts during collaboration by coupling opinion formation
with article editing in a bounded confidence dynamics. The complex social
behavior involved in editing articles is implemented as a minimal model with two
basic elements; (i) individuals interact directly to share information and convince
each other, and (ii) they edit a common medium to establish their own opinions.
Opinions of the editors and that represented by the article are characterised by a
scalar variable. When the pool of editors is fixed, three regimes can be
distinguished: (a) a stable mainstream article opinion is continuously contested
by editors with extremist views and there is slow convergence towards consensus,
(b) the article oscillates between editors with extremist views, reaching consensus
relatively fast at one of the extremes, and (c) the extremist editors are converted
very fast to the mainstream opinion and the article has an erratic evolution.
When editors are renewed with a certain rate, a dynamical transition occurs
between different kinds of edit wars, which qualitatively reflect the dynamics of
conflicts as observed in real Wikipedia data.
Keywords: Social dynamics; Mathematical modeling; Peer-production;
Wikipedia; Bounded confidence; Opinion dynamics; Mass-collaboration; Social
conflict
1 Introduction
Cooperative societies are ubiquitous in nature [1], yet the cooperation or the mu-
tual assistance between members of a society is also likely to generate conflicts [2].
Potential for conflicts is commonplace even in insect species [3] and so is conflict
management through policing and negotiation in groups of primates [4, 5]. In hu-
man societies cooperation goes further not only in its scale and range, but also in
the available mechanisms to promote conflict resolution [6, 7]. Collaborative and
conflict-prone human endeavors are numerous, including public policy-making in
globalized societies [8, 9], open-source software development [10], teamwork in op-
erating rooms [11], and even long-term partnerships [12]. Moreover, information
communication technology opens up entirely new ways of collaboration. With such
a diversity in system size and social interactions between individuals, it seems appro-
priate to study this phenomenon of social dynamics in the framework of statistical
physics [13, 14], an approach benefiting greatly from the availability of large scale
data on social interactions [15, 16].
As a relevant example of conflicts in social cooperation we select Wikipedia
(WP), an intriguing example of value production in an online collaborative en-
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vironment [17]. WP is a free web-based encyclopedia project, where volunteering
individuals collaboratively write and edit articles about any topic they choose. The
availability of virtually all data concerning the visiting and editing of article pages
provides a solid empirical basis for investigating topics such as online content pop-
ularity [16, 18] and the role of opinion-formation processes in a peer-production
environment [19].
The editing process in WP is usually peaceful and constructive, but some contro-
versial topics might give rise to extreme cases of disagreement over the contents of
the articles, with the editors repeatedly overriding each other’s contributions and
making it harder to reach consensus. These ‘edit wars’ (as they are commonly called)
result from complex online social dynamics, and recent studies [20] have shown how
to detect and classify them, as well as how they are related to burstiness and what
are their circadian patterns in editing activity [21].
Although collaborative behavior might appear without direct interactions be-
tween individuals, communication tends to have a positive effect on cooperation
and trust [22]. Indeed, more immediate forms of communication (voice as opposed
to text, for example) have been seen to increase the level of cooperation in online
environments [23]. In WP, direct communication is implemented via ‘talk pages’,
open forums where editors may discuss improvements over the contents of articles
and exchange their related opinions [24]. Discussions among editors are not manda-
tory [25], but there is a significant correlation between talk page length and the
likelihood of an edit war, indicating that many debates happen in articles and talk
pages, simultaneously [17, 26].
Overall, a minimal model aimed at reproducing the temporal evolution of a com-
mon medium (i.e. a product collectively modified by a group of people, like an
article in WP) requires at least the following two ingredients:
i agent-agent dynamics: Individuals share their views and opinions about
changes in the article using an open channel accessible to all editors (the talk
page or some other means of communication), thus effectively participating
in an opinion-formation process through information sharing.
ii agent-medium dynamics: Individuals edit the article if it does not properly
summarize their views on the subject, thus controlling the temporal evolution
of the article and coupling it to the opinion-formation mechanism.
We describe the opinion-formation process taking place in the talk page by means
of the well-known bounded confidence mechanism first introduced by Deffuant et
al. [27], where real discussions take place only if the opinions of the people involved
are sufficiently close to each other. Conversely, we model article editing by an ‘in-
verse’ bounded confidence process, where individuals change the current state of the
article only if it differs too much from their own opinions. Particularly, we focus our
attention on how the coupling between agent-agent and agent-medium interactions
determines the nature of the temporal evolution of an article. This we consider as a
further step towards the theoretical characterization of conflict in social cooperative
systems such as WP [28].
The text is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce and discuss the model
in detail. In Section 3 we describe our results separately for the cases of a fixed editor
pool and a pool with editor renewal, and finally make a comparison with empirical
observations on WP conflicts. In Section 4 we present concluding remarks.
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2 Model
Let us first assume that there is a system of N agents as potential editors for a
collective medium. The state of an individual i at time t is defined by its scalar,
continuous opinion xi(t) ∈ [0, 1], while the medium is characterized by a certain
value A(t) in that same interval. The variable x represents the view and/or inclina-
tion of an agent concerning the topic described by the common medium, while A is
the particular position actually represented by the medium.
Although it may seem too reductive to describe people’s perceptions by a scalar
variable x, many topics can actually be projected to a one-dimensional struggle
between two extreme, opposite options. In the Liancourt Rocks territorial dispute
between South Korea and Japan [29], for example, the values x = 0, 1 represent
the extreme position of favoring sovereignty of the islets for a particular country.
Other topics are of course multifaceted, generating discussions that depend on the
global affinity of individuals and multiple cultural factors [30]. While this complexity
could be tackled by the use of vectorial opinions [31, 32], our intention here is not to
describe extremism as realistically as possible, but to study the rise of collaborative
conflict even in the simplest case of binary extremism.
In the case of WP, the scalar variable A represents the opinion expressed by
the written contents of an article, which carries the assumption that all agents
perceive the medium in the same way. Real scenarios of public opinion might be more
complex, given the tendency of individuals to attribute their own views to others
and thus perceive false consensus [33], usually out of a social need to belong [34].
Even so, we consider A to be a sensible description of a WP article, one that could
initially be measured by human judgment in the form of expert opinions, or in
an automated way by quantifying lexical features and the use of certain language
constructs. We note, however, that the actual value of A is not the main concern
of our study. Instead, we are interested in how opinion differences in collaborative
groups may eventually lead to conflict, specifically when such opinion differences are
perceived with respect to a common medium that all individuals modify collectively.
2.1 Agent-agent dynamics
For the agent-agent dynamics (AAD) we consider a generic bounded-confidence
model over a complete graph [27, 35], that is, a succession of random binary en-
counters among all agents in the system. We initialize every opinion xi(0) to a
uniformly-distributed random value in the interval [0, 1]. The initial medium value
A(0) is chosen uniformly at random from the same interval. This way, even an ini-
tially moderate medium A ∼ 1/2 may find discord with extreme opinions at the
boundaries. For each interaction we randomly select two agents i, j and compare
their opinions. If the difference in opinions exceeds a given threshold T nothing
happens, but if |xi − xj | < T we update as follows,
(xi, xj) 7→ (xi + µT [xj − xi], xj + µT [xi − xj ]). (1)
The parameter T ∈ [0, 1] is usually referred to as the confidence or tolerance for
pairwise interactions, while µT ∈ [0, 1/2] is a convergence parameter. AAD is then
a symmetric compromise between similarly-minded individuals: people with very
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different opinions simply do not pay attention to each other, but similar agents
debate and converge their views by the relative amount µT .
The dynamics set by Eq. (1) has received a lot of attention in the past [13],
starting from the mean-field description of two-body inelastic collisions in granular
gases [36, 37]. Its final, steady state is comprised by nc ∼ 1/(2T ) isolated opinion
groups that arise due to the instability of the initial opinion distribution near the
boundaries. Furthermore, nc increases as T → 0 in a series of bifurcations [38]. In
the limit µT → 0 corresponding to a ‘stubborn’ society, the asymptotically final
value of nc also depends on µT [39, 40]. The bounded-confidence mechanism has
been extended in many ways over the years, considering interactions between more
than two agents [41], vectorial opinions [31, 42, 43, 44], and coupling with a constant
external field [45].
2.2 Agent-medium dynamics
For the agent-medium dynamics (AMD) we use what could be thought of as an
asymmetric, inverse version of the bounded-confidence mechanism described above.
When the opinion of a randomly chosen agent i is very different from the current
state of the medium, namely if |xi −A| > A, we make the update,
A 7→ A+ µA[xi −A], (2)
where A, µA ∈ [0, 1] are the tolerance and convergence parameters for AMD. In
other words, individuals that come across a version of the medium portraying a
radically different set of mind will modify it by the relative amount µA, where the
threshold to define similarity is given by A. Conversely, if |xi−A| < A we update,
xi 7→ xi + µA[A− xi]. (3)
meaning that individuals edit the medium when it differs too much from their
opinions, but adopt the medium’s view when they already think similarly. Observe
that the maximum meaningful value of µT is 1/2 (i.e. convergence to the average
of opinions), while the maximum µA = 1 implies changing the medium (opinion)
so that it completely reflects the agent’s (medium’s) point of view.
The previous rules comprise our model for the dynamics of conflicts in WP given
a fixed agent pool, that is, without agents entering or leaving the editing process of
the common medium. In a numerical implementation of the model, every time step
t consists of N updates of AAD given by Eq. (1) and of AMD following Eqs. (2)
and (3), so that time is effectively measured in number of edits and the broad inter-
event time distribution between successive edits (observed in empirical studies [20])
does not have to be considered directly. Given a fixed agent pool, AAD favors
opinion homogenization in intervals of length 2T and can thus create several opinion
groups for low tolerance, while AMD makes the medium value follow the majority
group. Then, for a finite system there is a nonzero probability that any agent outside
the majority group will be drawn by the medium to it, and the system will always
reach consensus after a transient regime characterized by fluctuations in the medium
value [28].
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However, in real WP articles the pool of editors tends to change frequently. Some
editors leave (due to boredom, lack of interest or fading media coverage on the
subject, or are banned from editing by editors at a higher hierarchical level) and
newly arrived agents do not necessarily share the opinions of their predecessors.
Such feature of agent renewal during the process or writing an article may destroy
consensus and lead to a steady state of alternating conflict and consensus phases,
which we take into account by introducing thermal noise in the model. Along with
any update of AAD/AMD, one editor might leave the pool with probability pnew and
be substituted by a new agent with opinion chosen uniformly at random from the
interval [0, 1]. The quantity 1/(Npnew) then formally acts as the inverse temperature
of the system, signaling a dynamical phase transition between different regimes of
conflict [28].
3 Results
3.1 Fixed agent pool
In the presence of a fixed agent pool (pnew = 0) with finite size N , the dynamics
always reaches a peaceful state where all agents’ opinions lie within the tolerance of
the medium. To show this, let us calculate the probability that an unsatisfied editor
i changes the medium A for n consecutive times, such that afterwards |xi−A′| < A
and the agent can finally stop its stream of edits. For fixed xi and following Eq. (2),
the final distance between editor and medium is |xi−A′| = (1−µA)n|xi−A|, so the
inequality |xi−A′| < A is satisfied if n > ln A/ ln(1−µA). The probability of agent
i not participating in AAD for n time steps is (1− 2/N)n, while the probability of
choosing it for AMD is 1/Nn. Then the total probability of this stream of edits is
(1 − 2/N)n/Nn, which for large N and µA ∼ 0 might be very small, but always
finite. After editor i gets into the tolerance interval of the medium, it will not
perform additional edits and will eventually adopt the majority opinion close to the
medium value. Similar events with other unsatisfied agents will finally result in full
consensus and put an end to the dynamics.
The existence of a finite relaxation time τ to consensus (for finite systems) con-
trasts drastically with the behavior of the bounded confidence mechanism alone,
where consensus is never attained for T < 1/2 [13]. In other words, the presence of
agent-medium interactions promotes an agreement of opinions that would otherwise
not exist in the agent-agent dynamics, even though it may happen after a very long
time (i.e. τ  0). If we think of the medium as an additional agent with maximum
tolerance (in the sense that it always interacts with the rest no matter what) and
against which agents have a different tolerance A (as opposed to T ), this result is
reminiscent of previous observations for a bounded-confidence model with hetero-
geneous thresholds [35, 46]. There, even a small fraction of ‘open-minded’ agents
with relatively high tolerance may bridge the opinion difference between the rest of
the agents and lead to consensus.
In order to analyze all possible typical behaviors of the fixed agent pool dynamics,
we perform extensive numerical simulations in systems of size ranging from N = 10
to 104, letting the dynamics evolve for a maximum time τmax = 10
4. We then
characterize the temporal evolution of medium and agent opinions as a function of
T , A and µA, while keeping pnew = 0 for all results in this Section. Finally, since
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the value of µT has no major effect other than regulating the convergence time of
AAD [39, 40], from now on we fix it to the maximum value µT = 1/2 in order to
speed up the simulations as much as possible.
A sample time series of medium and agent opinions is shown in Fig. 1. As a
function of the medium convergence µA the temporal evolution of the system shows
three distinctive behaviors. In regime I where µA is typically very small (Fig. 1 A
and D), there is one or more ‘mainstream’ opinion groups near x ∼ 1/2 with a
majority of the agents in the system, and a number of smaller, ‘extremist’ opinion
groups at positions closer to the boundaries x = 0, 1. The medium opinion stays
on average at the center of the opinion space, close to the mainstream group(s),
and although continuously contested by editors with extremist views, it remains
stable and leads to a very slow convergence towards consensus. The reason for a
long relaxation time in regime I is intuitively clear: for low µA any change in AMD
is small and thus both medium and extremist opinions fail to converge quickly.
When the tolerance T decreases the effect is even more striking; even though the
number of opinion groups is larger (according to the approximation nc ∼ 1/[2T ]),
the article is quite stable and remains close to the mainstream view.
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Figure 1 Temporal evolution of opinions and medium. (A, B, C) Time series of both the density
distribution P (x) of agents’ opinions x (color map) and the medium value A (line) for T = 0.2
and several µA values, signaling the three different regimes found in the dynamics. (D, E, F) The
same but for T = 0.04. Simulations correspond to A = 0.1 and N = 10
4.
In regime II identified with intermediate values of µA (Fig. 1 B and E), the fixed
pool dynamics produces quasi-periodic oscillations in the medium value A, which
appear after an initial stage of opinion group formation and end up very quickly in
total consensus. Quite surprisingly, the final consensual opinion is not x ∼ 1/2 (as
in regime I) or that of the initial mainstream group, but some intermediate value
closer to the extremist groups at the boundaries. This is indicative of a symmetry-
breaking transition: as µA increases, a symmetric stationary state at x ∼ 1/2 is
replaced by a final state close to 0 or 1. The oscillations in regime II can initially
be understood as a struggle over medium dominance among the different opinion
groups created by AAD. The AMD mechanism couples the medium dynamics with
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these groups, exchanging agents between them and thus modifying their positions,
until the majority group wins over the rest and consensus is achieved. For small T
oscillations are more well-defined and last for longer, while extremist groups tend
to diffuse towards the mainstream.
In regime III for large µA (Fig. 1 C and F), extremist agents directly converge
to a mainstream group and an article at the center. Since in this case µA is so
large, after any jump of the article extremist agents can enter its tolerance interval
and start drifting inwards. The limiting condition for this behavior is µA = 1 −
A/(1/2 − A) [28], a line separating regime III from the rest. A smaller T value
produces a more erratic medium evolution, with occasional jumps up and down.
The regimes of the fixed agent pool dynamics can be quantified on average by
taking a look at the cumulative distribution Pc(τ) of the relaxation time τ (Fig. 2).
In regime I the tail of Pc(τ) is quite flat, getting flatter as µA decreases. In contrast,
the distribution has a power-law and an exponential tail in regimes II and III,
respectively, signaling shorter relaxation times. The only exception is the transition
between II and III, where τ might be as large as in I. Since Pc(τ) tends to be
broad, the average value of τ is not very meaningful and we opt instead for the
probability P (τ > τmax) that the relaxation time is larger than a fixed maximum
time. Numerically, we estimate P (τ > τmax) as the fraction of realizations of the
dynamics that have not reached consensus after τmax time steps, out of a large
total of 104 realizations. In regimes II and III, P (τ > τmax) remains small as N
increases, indicating that τ is roughly independent of system size. On the other
hand, P (τ > τmax) scales with N for I and for the boundary between II and
III, even reaching 1 for appropriate values of µA and N . A corollary is that even
modestly-sized systems may only reach consensus after an astronomical time, if the
medium convergence value is appropriate.
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Figure 2 Distributions of relaxation time. (A, B, C) Cumulative distribution Pc(τ) of the
relaxation time τ necessary to reach consensus and thus end the dynamics, for different values of
the medium convergence µA. Insets: Probability P (τ > τmax) that the relaxation time is larger
than τmax = 104 (the maximum time allowed in the numerical simulations), as a function of N for
selected values of µA. The symbols I, II and III denote the three different regimes found in the
dynamics. Simulations correspond to T = 0.2, A = 0.1 and N = 10
4, with averages over 104
realizations.
The transition between regimes becomes even clearer when we consider the effect
of the medium tolerance A, resulting in a phase diagram for P (τ > τmax) in (A, µA)
space (Fig. 3 A). It turns out that regimes I and II cover most of the low A values,
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while the line µA = 1− A/(1/2− A) roughly signals the transition to regime III,
which covers a broad area of large A. As N increases, the transition to I from
either II or III (Fig. 3 B and C) becomes sharper: a consensual final state reached
after a very short time gives way to a stationary state that remains stable for really
long times. Such features of the phase diagram remain qualitatively unchanged if
we substitute P (τ > τmax) with another measure giving robust statistics, such as
the median relaxation time of the dynamics.
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Figure 3 Phase diagram for a fixed agent pool. (A) Phase diagram in (A, µA) space of the
probability P (τ > τmax) that the relaxation time is larger than τmax = 104, in a system of size
N = 104. Points give the (A, µA) values used in Fig. 2, corresponding to regimes I, II and III.
(B, C) Cross sections of the phase diagram along the dashed lines in (A) for varying N .
Simulations correspond to T = 0.2, with averages over 10
4 realizations.
Finally, we can consider the symmetry-breaking transition between regimes I and
II by taking a look at the density distribution P (A) of the final medium value (Fig. 4
A and B). After either τ or τmax has passed, the majority of opinions are in consensus
with A, making P (A) a good approximation for the final opinion distribution P (x)
as well. In regime I the medium distribution is roughly unimodal and peaked at
A ∼ 1/2, signaling a stable and moderate medium. Here the relaxation time is
quite long and for most realizations τ > τmax. In regime II, however, P (A) becomes
bimodal, meaning that the medium is more likely to end up close to the extremes
rather than in the center. When N is large, the main peaks in P (A) correspond
to consensual final states with τ ≤ τmax, while the secondary peaks are made up
of long-lived realizations with long relaxation time. Larger values of τmax, although
computationally expensive, would therefore let us see a strictly bimodal medium
distribution for regime II. As N increases the distribution peaks become sharper
and we can use the standard deviation σ(A) of the final medium value as an order
parameter for the transition (Fig. 4 C). In the thermodynamic limit N → ∞,
a vanishing σ(A) for I implies a stationary stable state with A ∼ 1/2 and no
consensus. As µA increases this symmetry gets broken, σ(A) becomes nonzero and
a true final state of consensus appears.
This symmetry-breaking mechanism may be understood analytically via a rate
equation formalism [28]. The resulting rate equation can be solved numerically
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Figure 4 Symmetry-breaking transition. (A, B) Distribution P (A) of the final medium value A
reached after a time min(τ, τmax) has elapsed, for varying N . The selected µA values represent
regimes I (A) and II (B). (C) Standard deviation σ(A) of the final medium value as a function of
µA, for several values of N . This order parameter signals a symmetry-breaking transition between
regimes I and II. Simulations correspond to T = 0.2, A = 0.0375 and τmax = 10
4, with
averages over 104 realizations.
assuming three editor groups: a mainstream at x ∼ 1/2 and two extremists with
opinions close to the boundaries. The solution shows stability for the medium at
the mainstream opinion when µA is small, but becomes unstable and oscillating for
µA ' 3A ± 0.1. The bifurcation transition is very sensitive on the position of the
extremists, depending not only on (µA, A) but also on the initial conditions. This
is in part the cause of the ‘noisy’ landscape of regime II in Fig. 3 A, which appears
regardless of the measure used to draw the phase diagram.
3.2 Agent renewal
In real systems the pool of collaborators is usually not fixed: Editors come and
go and very often the number of editors fluctuates in time as external events may
incite more or less attention. To keep things simple we only focus on systems with a
fixed number of editors (N agents), but we allow agent replacement with probability
pnew 6= 0. In our numerical simulations this happens prior to editing, and new agents
have initially random opinions coming from a uniform distribution.
If A < 1/2 there is always an opinion range outside the article tolerance region
[A − A, A + A] and new agents may enter such range and edit the article. From
WP data we know that even peaceful articles have few disputes now and then so
such a scenario is realistic. This is thus in contrast with the case of a fixed opinion
pool, where consensus is theoretically always achieved.
A stronger statement can be shown [28], namely that if
A > 
∗
A =
1
2− µA (4)
then consensus is always reached after a finite number of steps, but if A < 
∗
A there
are realizations that do not reach consensus ever. We show here an example: if the
medium value is A = ∗A, then for A = 
∗
A − ε an editor at x = 0 will disagree
with the article and change it by ∆ = ∗AµA, so the new medium value would be
A = 1 − ∗A. Afterwards an agent at x = 1 can restore the article to its previous
state and avoid consensus.
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The lack of full consensus does not mean that the system is always in a conflict
state. There are periods when A remains unchanged and these peaceful times are
ended by conflicts in which the opinion of the article is continuously disputed be-
tween agent groups of different opinion. If the dispute is settled (i.e. all agents are
satisfied by the article) a new peaceful period may start. The ratio of these peaceful
and conflicting periods changes with the parameters and may be considered as a
good candidate for an order parameter. Thus we define the order parameter P as
the relative length of the peaceful periods.
The order parameter is plotted for two different initial conditions in Fig. 5. The
top figure shows the value of the order parameter P for a ‘peaceful’ initial condition
when all agents had the opinion xi = 1/2. The bottom figure was instead obtained
for a system with ‘conflict’ initial conditions, namely one with 20% of agents divided
between two extremist groups of opinions 0 and 1 (and the rest at xi = 1/2) before
the start of the dynamics.
Figure 5 Order parameter for the agent renewal case. Order parameter P as a function of the
medium tolerance A and the agent replacement rate pnew for systems of size N = 80. The
chosen initial condition is consensus for the top diagram and conflict for the bottom one.
It is clear that there are two distinct regimes in the phase diagram of Fig. 5: one
characterized by P = 1 (‘peaceful’ regime), the other with P = 0 (‘conflict’ regime)
and a sharp transition in between. There is a region which is different in the two
cases and will be discussed later. We then identify the transition point with the
largest gradient of P by using the lower plot in Fig. 5. The resulting phase diagram
is shown in Fig. 6.
This transition is further illustrated in Fig. 7 where we display sample time evo-
lutions of the opinions of agents and medium. The left panel shows an example of
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Figure 6 Phase diagram for a system with agent renewal. Largest gradient of P by using the
lower plot in Fig. 5, for varying µA. Simulations correspond to T = 0.2 and system size ranging
from N = 10 to 640. The article convergence parameter was µA = 0.1, 0.2, 0.45, 0.7 for red,
green, blue and magenta respectively. The curved black line is the analytical result for µA = 0.1.
The horizontal line limiting the prepetual peace domain is at A = 0.15. The eternal peace is
limited by ∗A (shown with dashed lines for the same color) which depends on µA.
a peaceful regime. As mentioned before, from time to time new agents arrive with
incompatible views with respect to the article but they are pacified very fast, i.e.
the conflict periods are short. In the transition regime (middle panel) the scenario
of peaceful times interrupted by short conflicts is still observable, but periods of
continuous conflict occasionally appear. In the conflict regime exemplified by the
right panel, these conflict bursts become persistent and the peaceful periods tend
to disappear.
 0
 0.25
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 0.75
 1
 0  50000  100000  150000  0  50000  100000  150000  200000 50000  100000  150000 0
tt t
x,
A
Figure 7 Time evolution of opinions. Samples of medium/agent opinions as a function of time
for A = 0.42, and for three different regimes represented by pnew = 0.001, 0.002, 0.003 (from left
to right respectively). Colour coding is as follows: Red points (opinion of the article), green dots
(agents who are satisfied with the article), blue points (agents whose opinion is outside the
medium tolerance interval), and light blue background (conflict regions).
The above transition is the result of a competition between two timescales. New
agents arrive outside of the article’s tolerance interval with an ‘insertion’ timescale
τins ∝ Npnew. In order to have P > 0 the conflicts must be resolved before a new
extremist agent arrives. Let us note that the convergence is very fast if there is only
one extremist group. The problem is solved by displacing the article opinion by the
required amount, which can be done in few (N independent) steps. This is what
happens in the left panel of Fig. 7. On the other hand, if we have two extremist
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groups on both sides of the opinion interval the relaxation is much slower and this
is manifested in a much longer relaxation time. Thus, at the transition the insertion
timescale is equal to the relaxation time of the case with two extremist groups,
which is analogous to the fixed agent pool version of the model.
The task here is to determine the relaxation time of the fixed pool version of the
model and relate it to τins. For large values of the medium tolerance (A > 1/4),
the relaxation time can by calculated analytically [28],
τ(e) = c(µA)N
(
[2e2 + e20(n− 1)]n− ee0(n− 1)(2 + n)
)
, (5)
where e = ∗A − A, e0 = ∗A − 1/2, n denotes the integer part of e/e0 (which is
actually the number of steps the medium can make in one direction) and c is a
constant depending on µA.
The above approach works well for A > 0.3 and µA < 0.3 (regime III of the fixed
pool case). If the mainstream group gets dissatisfied either by the large jump (µA
is too large) or by the small tolerance (A too small) of the article, the reasoning
presented in [28] breaks down and new effect comes into play, namely the relaxation
times of the fixed pool system becomes be enormous (regime I).
As we enter regime I of the fixed pool dynamics the relaxation time increases
sharply (see Fig. 3 B and C). This means that if the system gets into a conflict
state it will remain there for ever, which happens for,
A,lim =
1
4
− T
2
. (6)
This is why, starting from a conflict initial condition, the lower phase diagram in
Fig. 5 shows P = 0 for A < 0.15. On the other hand, in order to initiate such a
conflict one needs to have a situation where two extremists appear on both ends of
the opinion space outside of the article tolerance interval. If we have a single ex-
tremist then the consensus will be reached within a few time steps, independently
of N . So the probability that we create a long-lasting conflict state decreases pro-
portionally to the agent replacement probability. This is why we see only peace on
the finite-time realizations leading to the upper phase diagram in Fig. 5. Had we
waited long enough, a conflict would have been formed for A < 1/4 − T /2 and
would have persisted further on.
In summary, the typical behavior of our model in the presence of agent renewal
may be divided into four distinct regimes:
i Eternal peace (A > 
∗
A): The system reaches consensus very fast and remains
there for ever.
ii Peace (A >
1
4− T2 and above the phase transition line): The system is mainly
in a consensual state and only interrupted by short disputes.
iii War (A >
1
4 − T2 and below the phase transition line): The system is mainly
in a state of disagreement.
iv Perpetual war (A <
1
4 − T2 ): In this regime and in the thermodynamic limit
N →∞ no consensus may exist.
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3.3 The case of Wikipedia
Although the model described and analyzed above is simplified enough to be ex-
tendable to various cases of collaboration, we specially intend to use it to explain
some of the empirical observations regarding edit wars in WP.
Wikipedia is huge, not only in its number of articles and users but in the number
of times articles are edited. In most cases articles are not written in a collaborative
way, i.e., they have single authors or a few authors who have written and edited
different parts of the article without any significant interaction [47]. In contrast,
a few cases show significant constructive and/or destructive interactions between
editors. The latter situation has been named ‘edit war’ by the WP community
and defined as follows: “An edit war occurs when editors who disagree about the
content of a page repeatedly override each other’s contributions, rather than trying
to resolve the disagreement by discussion” [48].
To start an empirical analysis of such opinion clashes and the way they are en-
tangled with collaboration, we need to be able to locate and quantify edit wars.
3.3.1 Controversy measure
An algorithm to quantify edit wars and measure the amount of social clashes for
WP articles has been introduced and validated before [49], and then used to study
extensively the dynamical aspects of WP conflicts [20]. An independent study [50]
has also shown that this measure is among the most reliable in capturing very
controversial articles.
We quantify the ‘controversiality’ of an article based on its edit history by focusing
on ‘reverts’ (i.e. when an editor completely undoes another editor’s edit and brings
the article back to the state just before the last version). Reverts are detected
by comparing all pairs of revisions of an article throughout its history, namely by
comparing the MD5 hash code [51] of the revisions. Specifically, a revert is detected
when two versions in the history line are exactly the same. In this case the latest
edit (leading to the second identical revision) is marked as a revert, and a pair of
editors, referred to as reverting and reverted editors, are recognized.
Very soon in our investigation we noticed that reverts can have different reasons
and not in all cases signalize a conflict of opinions. For example, an editor could
revert personal edit mistakes or someone else’s. Reverts are also heavily used to
suppress vandalism, in itself a different type of destructive social behavior, but
with no collaborative intention and therefore out of our interest. Thus we narrowed
down our analysis to ‘mutual reverts’. A mutual revert is recognized if a pair of
editors (x, y) is observed once with x as the reverter and once with y. We also
noticed that mutual reverts between pairs of editors at different levels of expertise
and experience in WP editing could contribute differently to an edit war. Two
experienced editors getting involved in a series of mutual reverts is usually a sign of
a more serious conflict, as opposed to the case when two newbies or a senior editor
and a newbie bite each other [52]. As a solution we introduced a ‘weight’ for each
editor, and to sum up all reverts within the history of an article we counted each
revert by using the smaller weight of the pair of editors involved in it. The weight
of an editor x is defined as the number of edits performed by him or her, and the
weight of a mutually reverting pair is defined as the minimum of the weights of the
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two editors. The controversiality M of an article is then defined by summing the
weights of all mutually reverting editor pairs, multiplying this number by the total
number of editors E involved in the article. Overall,
M = E
∑
all mutual reverts
min(Nd, N r), (7)
where N r, Nd are the number of edits for the article committed by the revert-
ing/reverted editor. This measure can be easily calculated for each article, irrespec-
tive of the language, size, and length of its history.
Before starting our discussion about the empirical dynamics of conflict and its
comparison with theoretical results, a remark on the most controversial articles in
WP. We have calculated M for all articles in 13 different languages, from the start
of each language WP up to March 2010. In Table 1 we show the list of the top-10
most controversial articles. A more complete and detailed analysis of the lists of the
most controversial WP articles in different languages and differences and similarities
between them can be found elsewhere [53].
Table 1 List of the most controversial articles in different language WPs according to M .
English German French Spanish Portuguese
1 George W. Bush Croatia Sg´ole`ne Royal Chile Sa˜o Paulo
2 Anarchism Scientology Unidentified flying object Club Ame´rica Brazil
3 Muhammad 9/11 conspiracy theories Jehovah’s Witnesses Opus Dei Rede Record
4 List of WWE personnel Fraternities Jesus Athletic Bilbao Jose´ Serra
5 Global warming Homeopathy Sigmund Freud Andre´s Manuel Lo´pez
Obrador
Greˆmio Foot-Ball Porto Ale-
grense
6 Circumcision Adolf Hitler September 11 attacks Newell’s Old Boys Sport Club Corinthians
Paulista
7 United States Jesus Muhammad al-Durrah inci-
dent
FC Barcelona Cyndi Lauper
8 Jesus Hugo Cha´vez Islamophobia Homeopathy Dilma Rousseff
9 Race and intelligence Minimum wage God in Christianity Augusto Pinochet Luiz Ina´cio Lula da Silva
10 Christianity Rudolf Steiner Nuclear power debate Alianza Lima Guns N’ Roses
Czech Hungarian Romanian
1 Homosexuality Gypsy Crime FC Universitatea Craiova
2 Psychotronics Atheism Mircea Badea
3 Telepathy Hungarian radical right Disney Channel (Romania)
4 Communism Viktor Orba´n Legionnaires’ rebellion &
ucharest pogro
5 Homophobia Hungarian Guard Movement Lugoj
6 Jesus Ferenc Gyurcsa´ny’s speech
in May 2006
Vladimir Tisma˘neanu
7 Moravia The Mortimer case Craiova
8 Sexual orientation change
efforts
Hungarian Far- right Romania
9 Ross Hedv´ıcˇek Jobbik Traian Ba˘sescu
10 Israel Polga´r Tama´s Romanian Orthodox Church
Arabic Persian Hebrew Japanese Chinese
1 Ash’ari Ba´b Chabad Koreans in Japan Taiwan
2 Ali bin Talal al Jahani Fatimah Chabad messianism Korea origin theory List of upcoming TVB series
3 Muhammad Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 2006 Lebanon War Men’s rights TVB
4 Ali People’s Mujahedin of Iran B’Tselem internet right-wing China
5 Egypt Criticism of the Quran Benjamin Netanyahu AKB48 Chiang Kai-shek
6 Syria Tabriz Jewish settlement in Hebron Kamen Rider Series Ma Ying-jeou
7 Sunni Islam Ali Khamenei Daphni Leef One Piece Chen Shui-bian
8 Wahhabi Ruhollah Khomeini Gaza War Kim Yu-Na Mao Zedong
9 Yasser Al-Habib Massoud Rajavi Beitar Jerusalem F.C. Mizuho Fukushima Second Sino-Japanese War
10 Arab people Muhammad Ariel Sharon GoGo Sentai Boukenger Tiananmen Square protests
of 1989
3.3.2 Dynamics of conflict and war scenarios
Measuring M can not only lead us to rank the articles based on their cumulative
controversy measure, but also enables us to follow edit wars in time as they emerge
and get resolved, by investigating the evolution of M as time passes and the article
develops. In the top row of Fig. 8 we show the time evolution of M for three different
sample articles.
Based on the way M evolves in time, we may categorize almost all controversial
articles into three categories:
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Figure 8 War scenarios for WP and our model. Top: Empirical controversy measure M as a
function of the number of article edits in three different war scenarios. From left to right, sample
articles are ‘Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy’, ‘Iran’, and ‘Barack Obama’; and
correspond to the regimes of ‘single war’, ‘war-peace cycles’, and ‘never-ending war’ respectively.
Bottom: Theoretical conflict measure S in the case of agent renewal, reproducing the qualitatively
analogue evolution of WP articles with parameter values N = 640, T = 0.2 and µA = 0.1, as
well as A = 0.35, 0.42, 0.30 and pnew = 0.001, 0.001, 0.002 for the three war scenarios,
respectively. Continuous lines correspond to selected single runs of the model, while the shading
indicates the density of S over an ensemble of 104 realizations.
i Single war to consensus: In most cases controversial articles can be included in
this category. A single edit war emerges and reaches consensus after a while,
stabilizing quickly. If the topic of the article is not particularly dynamic, the
reached consensus holds for a long period of time (top left in Fig. 8).
ii Multiple war-peace cycles: In cases where the topic of the article is dynamic
but the rate of new events (or production of new information) is not higher
than the pace to reach consensus, multiple cycles of war and peace may appear
(top center in Fig. 8).
iii Never-ending wars: Finally, when the topic of the article is greatly contested
in the real world and there is a constant stream of new events associated
with the subject, the article tends not to reach a consensus and M increases
monotonically and without interruption (top right in Fig. 8).
The empirical war scenarios described previously are in qualitative agreement
with the theoretical regimes of our model in the case of agent renewal, as seen from
both the sample time series in Fig. 7 and the regimes of war and peace in the phase
diagrams of Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. Unfortunately, the theoretical order parameter P is
quite difficult to measure in real systems as editor opinions are not known. What
we know instead is the controversy measure M of Eq. 7. As mentioned before, M
counts conflict events (i.e. mutual reverts) and weights them by the maturity of the
editor. This process can actually be repeated for the model: The editor maturity
Ti is then defined as the number of time steps an agent has been in the pool of
editors (a quantity constantly reset by agent replacement), and a conflict event is
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considered as the time an editor modifies the article, since this implies the agent is
not satisfied with the state of the medium.
Thus a theoretical counterpart S to the WP controversy measure M may be
defined as follows: Let S = 0 at the beginning of the dynamics. Then in each
update t∗ (out of the N that constitute a time step in the dynamics), when editor i
changes the state of the article by the amount ∆ = |A(t∗+1)−A(t∗)| we increment
S by Ti∆, where Ti measures the time i has been in the editorial pool. Examples of
the temporal evolution of S (lower row in Fig. 8) closely reproduce the qualitative
behavior of M for different war scenarios. To further compare empirical observations
in WP with our model predictions, we measure the typical length of a constant
‘plateau’ in the M and S time series, i.e. the number of edits between two successive
increments. As seen in the distribution of plateau length for WP and the model
(Fig. 9), a statistical agreement for all three war scenarios is clear.
Figure 9 Peace periods in WP and our model. Distribution of plateau lengths for selected
articles in WP (squares) and tuned parameters in our model (lines) for the three war scenarios
shown in Fig. 8. The length of a plateau or peace period is defined as the number of edits
between two successive increments in either M or S.
A last word on WP banning statistics. A way of estimating the number of ex-
tremists is to count the number of editors who have been ‘banned’ from editing.
Explicitly, “a ban is a formal prohibition from editing some or all WP pages, either
temporarily or indefinitely” [54]. Usually banning is used against vandals and/or
editors who violate WP policies, especially those related to edit wars. In Table 2
we give some statistics of editors at different classes of editing activity, according
to their number of edits. Interestingly, the relative population of banned editors is
larger among more experienced editors (i.e. editors with more than 1000 edits). In
other words, up to almost 20% of experienced editors could have been involved in
edit wars. This is in complete accord with the choices we have made for the model-
ing setup, namely having two active extremist groups with roughly 20% of the total
number of editors.
In˜iguez et al. Page 17 of 19
Table 2 Percentage of banned users to the total number of editors at three different classes.
Num. Editors w.
>1000 Edits
Ban. Editors w.
>1000 Edits
% ban. w.
>1000 edits
Num. Editors
w. >100 Edits
Ban. Editors w.
>100 Edits
% ban. w.
>100 edits
Num. Editors
w. >1 Edits
Ban. Editors w.
>1 Edits
% ban. w.
>1 edits
English 36280 6114 0.17 189174 20342 0.11 4552685 403851 0.09
German 8714 1561 0.18 34777 3458 0.10 511291 31996 0.06
French 5286 694 0.13 21940 1700 0.08 394385 16681 0.04
Spanish 3834 765 0.20 19135 2404 0.13 479305 21850 0.05
Portuguese 1733 345 0.20 8077 1015 0.13 194584 7486 0.04
Czech 700 112 0.16 2439 236 0.10 48030 2663 0.06
Hungarian 844 138 0.16 3107 276 0.09 49024 1201 0.02
Romanian 437 53 0.12 1675 130 0.08 36631 914 0.02
Arabic 610 96 0.16 2736 198 0.07 80498 1085 0.01
Persian 580 151 0.26 2531 406 0.16 56805 2544 0.04
Hebrew 1009 233 0.23 3898 515 0.13 53318 4341 0.08
Japanese 4010 786 0.20 19090 2845 0.15 242621 21995 0.09
Chinese 2106 378 0.18 9002 1072 0.12 160579 9387 0.06
4 Discussion and Conclusion
Here we have studied through modeling the emergence, persistence and resolution
of conflicts in a collaborative environment of humans such as WP. The value pro-
duction process takes place through interaction between peers (editors for WP) and
through direct modification of the product or medium (an article). While in most
cases this process is constructive and peaceful, from time to time severe conflicts
emerge. We modeled the dynamics of conflicts during collaboration by coupling
opinion formation with article editing in a generalized bounded-confidence dynam-
ics. The simple addition of a common value-production process leads to the replace-
ment of frozen opinion groups (typical of the bounded-confidence dynamics) with a
global consensus and a tunable relaxation time. The model with a fixed pool shows
a rich phase diagram with several characteristic behaviors: a) an extremely long
relaxation time, b) fast relaxation preceded by oscillating behavior of the medium
opinion, and c) an even faster relaxation with an erratic medium. We have observed
a symmetry-breaking, bifurcation transition between regimes a) and b), as well as
divergence of the relaxation time in the transition between regimes b) and c).
If the pool is not fixed and editors are exchanged with new ones at a given rate, we
obtain two different phases: conflict and peace. A conflict measure can be defined
for the modeled system and be directly compared to its empirical counterpart in
real WP data. It is then possible to follow the temporal evolution of this measure
of controversy and obtain a good qualitative agreement with the empirical observa-
tions. These results lead us to plausible explanations for the spontaneous emergence
of current WP policies, introduced to moderate or resolve conflicts.
Two remarks are at place here. In this study we have used a particular collabo-
ration environment and compared our results with WP. The main reason behind is
that for the free encyclopedia we have a full documentation of actions; however, we
should emphasize that as web-based collaborative environments are abundant, we
believe that our approach and results are much more general. Second, we are aware
of the fact that the model contains a number of stringent simplifications: There
are cultural differences between the WPs (e.g., in the usage of the talk page), and
as in all human-related features there are large inhomogeneities in the opinions, in
the tolerance level and in the activity of editors. Some of these aspects are under
current study and will be taken into account for future research.
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